A vulnerability in Optimizely’s web experimentation platform allowed an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, which was then served to visitors of at least 178 organizations — including HSBC, CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, Equifax, GitLab and IKEA — straight from the vendor’s own content delivery network and under its valid TLS certificate. The campaign, tracked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 as OPTIMJACK, ran for roughly 17 hours on November 16, 2026, and none of the victim organizations had their own servers breached.
- Scale of exposure: Report URI found malicious code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it inspected, spanning 178 organizations; researchers believe the true figure is higher.
- What the payload did: It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses across multiple chains, skimmed payment card details from site-native forms, harvested readable cookies and screenshots, and routed iPhones and iPads toward iOS exploit kits.
- Modest haul, serious lesson: Attacker wallets had received only about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on November 16, but the delivery path — a trusted third-party script — is the real story for security teams.
How a testing tool became an attack vector
Optimizely supplies software that lets businesses run A/B tests and personalize their pages. Sites embed a small JavaScript snippet that pulls the vendor’s code into each visitor’s browser. According to Optimizely, an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in the account signup flow of its Experimentation product and used it to add JavaScript to the custom Project JavaScript field of some customer projects, leaving the rest of each snippet untouched.
Because the tampered files were still delivered from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely’s certificate, every affected site was effectively serving attacker code from a domain it already trusted. Report URI’s timeline records a clean capture of the BBC’s snippet at 02:21 UTC on November 16, an injected version at 04:21 UTC, and the main payload loading on bbc.com by 08:28 UTC. The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC, the card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC, and the iPhone exploit stage followed shortly after 17:00 UTC.
“The uncomfortable lesson is that none of the victims were breached. Their own infrastructure was untouched; a vendor’s script turned hostile and their sites served it to every visitor,” said Scott Helme, the security researcher at Report URI who discovered the campaign.
The attacker also built in resilience. Three loader variants circulated — a plain script tag, a Base64-obfuscated version, and one carrying a full copy of the payload executed via eval if the attacker’s domain was blocked. On one HSBC site, that backup copy ran even though the primary payload file was blocked. The payload was rebuilt 26 times in a single day, and one loader deleted its own script elements after three seconds.
What was stolen, and what cannot be counted
The injected code was a multi-purpose toolkit. It continuously scanned pages and the clipboard for wallet addresses across eight chains, replacing them with attacker-controlled addresses when they appeared near words such as “wallet,” “deposit” or “send.” It hooked form submissions and outgoing fetch/XHR requests, validating card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs before exfiltrating them. It also collected page URLs, JavaScript-readable cookies and rendered screenshots. On iOS devices it inserted references routing the browser to exploit-kit infrastructure, with routing selected by iOS version; Report URI identified the kits as Coruna and DarkSword and advised updating to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
Cards entered inside hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were out of reach. The financial damage measured so far is small: about $7,040 in cryptocurrency by the evening of November 16, held in wallets since emptied. But as Peter Lowe, threat research lead at ZeroFox, cautioned, money is only the countable part — non-HttpOnly cookies, card details typed into site-native forms and exploit chains served to unpatched iPhones are impacts nobody can measure from outside.
Why standard defenses missed it
Web application firewalls and server-side monitoring watch traffic to and from a company’s own infrastructure. This code never touched it, travelling from the vendor’s CDN directly into visitors’ browsers and changing outside each site’s release process. Of 256 affected hosts reviewed by Reflectiz, 68 had no Content Security Policy at all and only 24 blocked the payload. Helme noted that some victims served the snippet from their own domains yet were still infected because they proxied the live file.
Optimizely says it patched the flaw, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts; Report URI reported all monitored infected files clean by 23:11 UTC on November 16. Unit 42’s guidance centres on segmentation: strip non-essential marketing, experimentation and analytics tags from authentication and checkout pages, and isolate payment collection inside hardened cross-origin iframes. Helme and Lowe recommend starting with a CSP in report-only mode to build an inventory from real traffic, then alerting on unexpected new scripts, changes to trusted files and data flowing to new destinations.
The broader implication is structural. Modern pages assemble dozens of third-party scripts, and any one of them with dynamic execution privileges carries the same authority as the site’s own developers. A single signup-flow flaw at one vendor reached visitors of banks, credit agencies, airlines and newsrooms simultaneously — and most of those organizations lacked the monitoring to notice a trusted file changing in the middle of the night. The small haul reflects a clumsy or unlucky operator, not a limited attack surface; the same access, held longer and used more patiently, would have gone largely undetected.
Sources & References
- CNN, BBC, Zoom, and other sites served malicious code in supply-chain attack
- Borrowed Code, Real Consequences: What OPTIMJACK Teaches Us
- Optimizely supply chain attack turns trusted scripts against 178 orgs
- Optimizely Flaw Exploited to Serve Malicious Code
- Optimizely Supply Chain Attack: Lessons From Zoom and CNN | Reflectiz